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NOTES AND COMMENTS

and be sued would seem to indicate that it intended the Corporation to
be subject to the same rules.of law as private insurance companies. The
Supreme Court could have avoided the effect of the Corporation's Wheat
Crop Insurance Regulations in the same manner as did the Idaho Supreme Court.3 ' That court said that Congress did not intend such regulations to be binding law but merely rules for the Corporation's own
guidance and for the guidance of its agents. However, the Court did
not find that Congress intended the law of private insurance companies
to be applicable to the Corporation.
In the future, if goyernment corporations which are engaging in
commercial activities are to be held amenable-to the same rules of law
as private corporations -Congress must clearly manifest that intention
in the statutes creating them.
WILLrAM T. JOYNER, JR.
Adoption-Invalidation for Want of Consent
In Allen v. Morgan,' the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the
action of the trial court in denying plaintiff's petition for adoption of
defendants' child, and vacating the interlocutory order of adoption
granted eight months prior to entry'of the judgment.
The defendants were married after conception but before birth of
the child. On learning of this the husband's step-mother began to
apply pressure to have the child adopted. The defendants testified that
the step-mother "suggested" that the mother go to a waiting home and
put the child out for adoption, in order that the step-mother could hold
*up both "her head" and "her social standing." One month after its
birth they took the child to Saluda, North Carolina and left it in the
care of a doctor, until the defendants "could get situated." Three days
later the defendants signed the consent, "because of the constant pressure being put on us day and night." The plaintiffs were residents of
Georgia and were qualified in every way to become adoptive parents.
Neither they nor their attorney had knowledge of any coercion that
might have been practiced on the defendants.
The court, in construing the statute2 requiring consent of the natural parents, held that both the letter and spirit of the statute gives the
court, "full and unrestricted power to examine into the nature and kind
of consent by parents to an adoption, not only because it is absolutely
(1940), 38 U. S. C. §§801, 805 (1940). The War Risk Insurance of the First
World War was administered by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department. 40 STAr. 398 (1917).
"Merrill v. Federal Crop Ins. Corporation, 174 P. 2d 834 (Idaho 1946).
144 S. E. 2d 500 (Ga. 1947).
no adoption
2GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1937) §74-403 (Supp. 1945) "...
shall be permitted except with the written consent of the living parents of the
child,.. :'
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prerequisite to the validity of an order granting a prayer for adoption,
but because the wisdom of the grant, the welfare of the child and of
the other parties, as well as the public policy of the State is involved."
With the exception of Maryland,3 the states uniformly require the
consent of the natural parent or parents to give validity to an adoption,
absent special circumstances such as abandonment. Prior to 1941,
North Carolina required that the consent be given to the specific adoption,4 but in 1941 an amendment was added to the statute, overruling
these decisions. 5
There is a wide divergence of opinion as to whether or not consent,
voluntarily given, may be arbitrarily withdrawn at any time before
entry of the final decree. 6 Some courts refuse to grant the final order
of adoption over the objection of the natural parents, even though they
had previously consented to it.7 It may be stated generally that this
view emanates from the now outmoded doctrine of strictly construing
adoption statutes in favor of the rights of the natural parents.
Conversely, many tribunals have denied the right to revoke and
have based such denials on: (1) principles of contract;8 (2) estoppel
or other equitable grounds ;9 (3) public policy favoring the adoption of
children, particularly illegitimates ;1o (4) welfare of the child.1"
Analysis of these cases discloses that though the courts speak in
terms of contract, estoppel, public policy and welfare of the child, much
depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Indeed,
at least one court 12 has announced this to be the rule. Accordingly,
parents were allowed to revoke13 shortly after execution of their consent
and before entry of the final decree, and before adoptive parents had
'Adoption of Lagumis, 46 A. 2d 189 (Md. 1946) ("The Maryland statute
differs from that of most of the states in not requiring the consent of the parents
in any case ....

).

'Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. Rxv. 127, 143 (1941).
N. C. GEN STAT. (1943) §48-5: ". . . and no further consent of the parent,

parents, or guardian to a subsequent specific adoption shall be necessary. .
6N.

C.

GEN. STAT.

."

(1943) §48-5 provides among other things that where the

child has been surrendered to a licensed child-placing agency or to the Superintendent of Public Welfare of the County, the attending consent is irrevocable.
Where surrendered to others for adoption, the attending consent becomes irrev-

ocable after six months.

' In re McDonnell's Adoption, 176 P. 2d 153 (Cal. 1947) ; In re White's Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N. W. 2d 579 (1942) ; Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435,

183 N. W. 956 (1921); Wright v. Fitzgibbons, 198 Miss. 471, 21 So. 2d 709
(1945); Application of Graham, 199 S. W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1947); Adoption of

Caparelli, 175 P. 2d 153 (Ore. 1946) ; In re Nebns, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748
(1929) ; see Allen v. Morgan, 44 S. E. 2d 500, 506 (Ga. 1947).
I Durden v. Johnson, 194 Ga. 689, 22 S. E. 2d 514 (1942) ; Stanford v. Gray,
42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423 (1913).
9
Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 459, 198 N. E. 758 (1935).
0 In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944); Ex parte
Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947).
"Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181, S. W. 2d 457 (1944).
"Hammond v. Chadwick, 199 S. W. 2d 547 (Tex. 1947).
Id.
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custody of the child for a considerable time and had spent much money
on it.14 On the other hand, the right to revoke was denied where the
fully qualified adoptive parents took custody of the child and devoted
time and money toward carrying out their duty as foster parents for
fifteen months without objection from the consenting mother. 15
The extreme on this point was reached by the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia in the case of In re Adoption of a Minor.'"
Basing its decision on the public policy of Congress in maintaining the
new relationship, the court held that consent of the mother given two
months before birth of the child was valid and irrevocable. Though on
its face the decision was based on congressional policy, with a hint at
estoppel, 17 the facts of the particular case seemed to control the outcome. These facts were that the adoptive parents had taken custody,
that the court had acted on the consent that the attempt to revoke came
two months after birth, the illegitimacy of the child, and the qualifications of the adoptive parents to rear the child. 18
There is a definite trend toward denial of the right arbitrarily to
revoke consent that is voluntarily given. These decisions are parallel
to, and grow out of, the trend toward a more liberal construction of
adoption statutes with a view toward maintaining the new status of the
child.' 9
The decided cases establish the proposition that the decree of adoption may be set aside for: (1) fraud practiced on the court;20 (2) undue
influence practiced on the adopting parent by the natural parent;21 (3)
undue influence practiced by the adoptee ;22 (4) gaining of the consent
"'Accord, Skaggs v. Gannon, 293 Ky. 795, 170 S. W. 2d 12 (1943) (where
suffident reason is shown, mother may revoke consent within sixty days allowed
for appeal from the adoption order).
" Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181 S. W. 2d 457 (1944).
" 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944).
" Id. at 651. Consent was irrevocable, "...
especially after having been presented to the court and acted upon by the appellants who were . . . innocent
strangers who acted in good faith."
"8A different construction of the case-i.e. consent given before birth is irrevocable regardless of the peculiar facts of the case-would lead to an extremely
harsh result. There can be no reason to cause a mother to face the ordeal of
giving birth to a child which she knows she cannot keep, just because she erred in
giving her consent, possibly in one of the trying moments that often accompany

pregnancy, which she now wishes to withdraw. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended its policy to be so far reaching.
It also seems that a good argument against such a rule could be made on the
basis of public policy.
' Compare Ex parte Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947), with Platzer v.
Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N. W. 956 (1921); Application of Graham, 199
S. W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1947).
"0Platt v. Magagnini, 110 Cal. 699, 251 Pac. 205 (1920) (defendants adopted
the child while knowing it could not live, in order to inherit from it) ; Stevens v.
Halstead, 168 N. Y. S. 142, 181 App. Div. 198 (1917) (adult woman lived in
adultery with an aged man in order to induce him to adopt her).
Phillips v. Chase, 203 Mass. 556, 89 N. E. 1049 (1909).
Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S. W. 896 (1927).
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of the natural parents by the use of fraud or undue influence ;23 and
(5) such grounds as would entitle the court to vacate any other order
or decree. 24
No cases are found which distinguish between fraud and undue
influence which is practiced by the adoptive parents and that practiced
by third persons. In Lambert v. Taylor2 5 there was fraud in the factum
of the written consent. Fraud was induced by persons in the natural
father's family, but there was no showing of participation by the adoptive parents. The court set aside the decree, reciting the usual rule as
26
to fraud.
To set aside an adoption decree on the ground that the natural
parents' consent thereto was due to mistake or fraud, such mistake or
fraud must have been with respect to an existing fact, rather than a
mere matter of opinion or belief as to something to happen in the future,
regardless of how greatly such matter influenced the giving of the consent.2 7 Likewise, "undue influence," such as will warrant setting the
adoption aside means that the person exercising the influence so far
dominated the will of the other as to substitute his will for such other,
so that his act is in reality the act of the person exercising the influence.2 8 Accordingly,'it was held that advice of doctors, made in good
faith, that the plaintiff would not survive her case of tuberculosis was
not fraud. 29 Duress was not established by showing that the consent
was given due to the "irresistible pressure of the circumstances" and
plaintiff's "mental condition" caused by her husband's refusal to support her and threats of leaving her after learning that she was the
mother of an illegitimate child. 30 The same result was reached where
the plaintiff was "put to shame" and "great emotional tension" as a
result of pleas of her brother that she put her illegitimate child out for
adoption.3 1
It appears, therefore, that the instant case is not only against the
weight of authority on this point, but is patently wrong.3 2 This fact situation, from which the court found duress, is the rule rather than the ex3
Lambert
2, State ex

v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 159 (1942).
rel Bradshaw v. Probate Court of Marion County, 73 N. E. 2d 769

(Ind. 1947).
" 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 159 (1942). (The result of this case is indefensible
because there was a delay of five years in bringing the suit. The court noted the
laches but cast it aside because no such issue was properly presented. These
adoptive parents, who spent their money, love, and affection on the child for five
years, cannot regard very highly the "justice" of such a harsh penalty for their
unfortunate choice of attorneys.).
20 Decree may be set aside for fraud.
27
Nealon v. Farris, 131 S. W. 2d 858 (Mo. 1939).
.8 Phillips v. Chase, 203 Mass. 556, 89 N. E. 1049 (1909).
20
Nealon v. Farris, 131 S. W. 2d 858 (Mo. 1939).
20 Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423 (1913).
"Adoption of Caparelli, 175 P. 2d 153 (Ore. 1946).
2 But see Westendorf v. Westendorf, 187 Iowa 659, 174 N. W. 359 (1919).
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ception. In the case of illegitimacy there is likely to be someone in the
mother's family applying pressure on her to have the child adopted so
that the family can "hold up their heads." Let such "duress" be valid
grounds for setting aside the adoption-add to this the fact that the majority of adoptees are illegitimate3 3-and the result is that a substantial
percentage of adoptions have been undermined. Knowing of this decision, all the mother who has change4 her mind has to do, to have a perfectly valid adoption set aside, is to have a relative come into court and
tell how he or she put the mother to great shame by showing her what a
disgrace the illegitimate child was going to be and "suggesting" that
she put it out for adoption.
The decision completely ignores the fact that the plaintiffs are perfectly innocent third persons who had nothing to do with the "duress,"
and who, in good faith, put forth their money, love and affection only
to be forced to stand by and watch their efforts go up in the "smoke"
of a family squabble with which they were not concerned.
The case seems to be another product of the outworn theory that
adoption statutes, being in derogation of the common law and the par34
This theory was
ents' natural rights, should be strictly construed.
35
The more modern view recognizes the fact
announced by the court.
that such legislation is not intended to supplement the common law, but
completely to supplant it. Accordingly, it is held that the statutes should
that the adoption may be upheld and
be construed liberally, to the end
36
the assumed relation sustained.
The North Carolina decisions, prior to 1943, are based on the strict
3
view, 37 and resulted in the wholesale thwarting of adoptions. & Then
39
came the case of Locke v. Merrick wherein Mr. Justice Schenck,
quoted from40 and cited with approval the case of McConnell v. McConnell,41 which is a leading case for the liberal view. Due to the high
degree of success and the social desirability of adoption as compared to
" Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. REv. 127, 131 (1941).
" Smith v. Smith, 180 P. 2d 853 (Idaho 1947) ; Application of Graham et al,
199 S. W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1947); Adoption of Caparelli, 175 P. 2d 153 (Ore. 1946).
"44 S. E. 2d 500, 506 (Ga. 1947).
In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944) ; McConnell v.
McConnell, 345 Ill. 70, 177 N. E. 692 (1931); Seibert v. Seibert, 170 Iowa 561,

153 N. W. 160 (1915) ; Ex parte Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947) ; Locke v.
Merrick, 223 N. C. 799, 22 S.E. 2d 523 (1943).
17 Ward v. Howard, 217 N. C. 799, 7 S.E. 2d 625 (1940).
Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. REv. 127 (1941).
"223 N. C. 799, 22 S.E. 2d 523 (1943).
,0Id. at 803 ". .. it is well to remember that since the right of adoption is not
only beneficial to those immediately concerned but, likewise, to the public, construction of the statute should not be narrow or technical nor compliance therewith

examined with a judicial microscope in order that every slight defect may be
magnified . . . ." The value of the case as a precedent is questionable because
no mention was made of the previous North Carolina cases, and the decision would
likely have been the same under the strict view.
70, 177 N. E. 692 (1931).
4-345 Ill.
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institutions or leaving children with unfit parents, 42 the liberal view is
the more desirable one, and it is to be hoped that our court will follow
43
the attitude expressed in the Locke case.
Because the law of North Carolina thwarted adoptions instead of
furthering them, necessary changes were made in the statute in 1941. 4 4
The statute was made cumbersome by this patchwork, therefore in 1947
a complete revision of the old statute was passed for the purpose of
organization and clarification. 45 Because the enacting clause was
omitted, however, the North Carolina Supreme court held
that the at46
This statute expressly
tempted enactment is entirely null and void.
embodied the liberal policy here advocated. 47 It would be highly beneficial if the next legislature would see fit to re-enact the statute, with
additional improvements 48 and the necessary enacting clause.
The better view as provided.by statute in North Carolina, 4 0 is that
entry of the final decree is final and cannot be set aside for failure fully
to protect the rights of the natural parents where they are made parties.
By the logic of the instant case it would make no difference whether the
final decree had been entered or not, because according to the rule laid
down, a decree without consent is no decree at all, and consent given
under duress is no consent at all. Even conceding the contention that
there was duress the case still has potentialities of thwarting adoptions.
The person on whom the duress has been practiced can wait for years
and assert his rights at leisure, the adoptive parents in the meantime
having expended all the effort that accompanies parenthood in bringing
the child through the most difficult years. Greater consideration than
this should be given to the attachment between the adoptive parents and
the child that has grown out of the new relationship. Since it is highly
desirable that the break between the infant and the mother be abrupt
and final, 50 the natural parents should not be heard to assert any such
objection after the probationary period is over and the final decree
entered. Public policy demands that the adoption statutes should not
' Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. REv. 127 (1941).

In re
'q For an excellent discussion of modern policy toward adoptions see:
Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944).
"Statutorwy Changes in. N. C. in 1941, 19 N. C. L. Rxv. 435, 449-453 (1941).
" A Survey of Statutory Changes, 25 N. C. L. Rxv. 376, 408-412 (1947).
ln re Advisory Opinion, 227 N. C. Appendix, 43 S. E. 2d 73 (1947).
N. C. Pub. Laws, 1947, c. 885.
The statute included in its express declaration of primary purposes

"...

and

to protect them (children) from interference, long after they have become properly
adjusted in their adoptive homes, by natural parents who may have some legal
claim because of a defect in the adoption procedure."
It included in its express declaration of secondary purposes

"...

and to protect

foster parents . . . and prevent later disturbance of their relationship to the child
by natural parents whose legal rights have not been fully protected."
"IA Survey of Statutory Changes, 25 N. C. L. REv. 376, 408-412 (1947).
'9 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §48-5.
'1 In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944).
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be nullified by a decision that causes the.public to, fear the consequences
of adopting a child when their efforts are at the whim and caprice of
51
the natural parent.
J. W. ALEXANDER, JR.
Bills and Notes-Reacquisition-Liability of Intermediate
Indorser to Purchaser from Reacquiring Payee
The payee of a negotiable promissory note indorsed the note to the
defendant. The defendant shortly thereafter indorsed it back to the
payee, who indorsed to the plaintiff. Plaintiff was admittedly a holder
in due course. All indorsements were special. Held: Reacquisition by
the payee gave the note a "fresh start," terminating the contractual
liability of the intermediate indorser, so that he could not be regarded
as in the line through which the holder traced his title.'
It is important that the problem of the instant case be distinguished
at the outset from that arising under §582 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law.
We are here concerned with a holder who is a holder in due course
in his own right. The specific question is: Does an indorser remain
liable to a subsequent holder in due course, in spite of reacquisition by
a prior party, when the holder took with notice of the reacquisition?
Section 58, 3 on the other hand, deals with defenses available to prior
parties when the instrument is in the hands of a holder not in due
course. This section reads as follows: "In the hands of any holder
other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to
the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due course and who is not himself a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights
of such former holder in respect of all parties prior to the latter." Thus
the specific question arising under this section is: Under what circumstances can a holder not in due course avoid the defenses of prior
parties ?
This distinction is necessary, for, as will be noted below, the courts
by
have confused the issue somewhat in discussing the instant problem,
4
drawing §58 into the picture, though it is obviously inapplicable.
Ex parte Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947).
1

Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson, 304 Ky. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947), briefly
MicH. L. REv. 97.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-64 (quoted in text below).

noted in 46

IN. C.
IN.

C. GEN.

STAT.

(1943) §25-64.

For an extensive discussion of the problem arising under this section, see Chafee,
The Reacquisition of a. Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party, 21 CoL L. Rxv.
538 (1921). Also see Note, 1 N. C. L. REv. 187 (1923).
, See 46 MIcE. L. Rnv. 97, 98 (1947) (brief discussion of the difference between these two problems).

